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The Uprising of the Catalan servile peasants {remenees) between 1462 
and 1486 was unusual in the history of European insurrections. Waged by 
a surprisingly well-armed force of peasants who played an important military 
role as supporters of the king, it resulted in the first official abolition of 
peasant servitude with the Sentencia Arbitral de Guadalupe. Part of the 
complex political background to the conflict was an ideological contradiction 
within the ruling classes of Catalan society, first perceptible in the late 
thirteenth century, in which legal and historical justifications for servitude 
were opposed by assertions that it violated divine law and Catalan custom. 
Although a unique event, the remença revolt was also one among 
many late medieval and early modern peasant wars. The period from the 
Black Death to the German Peasants' War of 1525 witnessed peasant 
uprisings of a greater intensity and geographical scope than in any historical 
era that preceded or followed. Long before 1348, it is true, rural society was 
"Anuario de Hsludios Medievales", 26 (1996) 
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punctuated by regional insurrections such as the Stellinga Revolt in Saxony 
(841-842) or small revolts in particular locales such as the attempt by tenants 
of Darnell and Over in the north of England in the early fourteenth century 
to procure their freedom from serfdom by legal as well as violent means^ 
Most of these incidents, however, were centered around local grievances 
while those after 1300 were both more numerous and of greater scale and 
duration .^ Peter Bierbrauer has counted no less than 59 peasant uprisings in 
the German Empire from 1336 to 1525^ The French Jacquerie of 1358, the 
English Rising of 1381, the German "Bundschuh" conflicts of the late-
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and the German war of 1525 are, 
along with the Catalan war, the most famous large-scale conflicts. Others of 
significance are not as prominent in historical memory not because they were 
minor but because of the difficulty of the sources or the secondary literature. 
A major uprising in Krain (modern Slovenia) in 1515 is virtually unknown 
to historians of western Europe as its extensive historiography is almost 
entirely in Slovene .^ 
Not quite unknown, but certainly not fully appreciated in its 
comparative implications, is the Hungarian peasant uprising which took place 
the spring and summer of 1514. It began as a crusade against the Turks but 
turned into a species of holy war against the Hungarian nobility. The 
Hungarian war has certain features that invite comparison with Catalonia: a 
militarily well-organized peasantry, an unpopular ruler from a non-native 
dynasty, grievances centered on servitude, a revolt that did not involve (as 
the German, English and Bohemian cases did) a revolutionary religious 
'For the Stellinga revolt, Eric J. GOLDBERG, Popular Revolt, Dynastic Politics and 
Aristocratic Factionalism in the Early Middle Ages: The Saxon Stellinga" Reconsidered, 
"Speculum", 70 (1995), pp. 467-501. For the revolt of Darnell and Over in 1336 and the events 
leading up to it. The Ledger-Book of Vale Royal Abbey, ed. John BROWNBILL in "Lancashire 
and Cheshire Record Society", 68 (1914), pp. 37-42. 
-Rolf KÕHN, Frei hei t ais Forderung und Zi e I bâuerlichen Widerstandes (Mitel-und 
Westeuropa, 11-13 Jahrhundert), "Vortrage und Forschungen", 39 (1991), pp. 325-387. An 
exception is the five-year war waged by Flemish peasants for which see William H. TEBRAKE, 
A Plague of insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Franders, 1323-1328, 
Philadelphia, 1993. 
^Peter BIERBRAUER, Bauer li che Revolt en im alten Reich. Ein Forschungsbericht, in "Aufruhr 
und Emporung? Studien zum bâuerlichen Widerstand im Alten Reich", ed. Peter BLICKLE ET 
AL., Munich, 1980, pp. 26, 62-65. 
'^ Studied especially by the late Bogo Grafenauer. Bibliography in GRAFENAUER, 
Gospodarska in druzbena zgodovina Slovencev, Ljublana, 1970, pp. 498-499 including some 
older works in German. 
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ideology. Most curious of all, however, is that in both Hungary and 
Catalonia the institution of servitude was justified by reference to historical 
myths explaining why and when nobles and servile peasants were separated 
by reason of the courage of the one and the cowardice of the other. In both 
Catalonia and Hungary, these myths were first developed in the latter half 
of the thirteenth century. 
Elsewhere I have tried to compare the Catalan revolt with the 
German Peasants' War of 1525 in order to show that a full-scale revolt did 
not require an anti-clerical or reform ideology^ Here I would like to extend 
that comparison which is intended to further a comparative understanding of 
the general European movement of peasant revolt in the late Middle Ages 
and its earlier ideological background. 
1. THE HUNGARIAN INSURRECTION OF 1514 
One of the most interesting things about the Hungarian uprising is 
that it demonstrates how a radical movement could be stimulated by the most 
traditional forms of Catholic piety. As in Catalonia, a peasant revolt was 
launched and justified without being accompanied or inspired by an intense 
attack on the established church, its doctrines or administration. The absence 
of a religious reform motive shows that, contrary to what is often assumed 
with reference to the case of Germany in 1525, a protracted and radical 
peasant movement could spread without the external stimulus of urban 
religious unrest. Religious enthusiasm is more obvious in Hungary than in 
Catalonia as the insurrection began as a consequence and inspiration of what 
would might at first seem an archaic form of piety, a crusade. 
For Hungary, occupying a beleaguered frontier with the Turks, the 
crusade was not an antiquated idea as it was in the West by the late Middle 
Ages for the Turks were an immediate peril. In the aftermath of the crucial 
Battle of Mohács (1526), they would conquer almost all of Hungary and 
occupy or indirectly control most of its traditional lands until the end of the 
seventeenth century. Much of the attention of the Hungarian monarchs of the 
fifteenth century was directed to an attempt to stem the Turkish expansion 
^Dues guerres pageses: Remenees catalans i camperais alemanys, "Pedralbes: Revista 
d'Història Moderna", 14 (1994), pp. 39-59. 
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that accelerated after the conquest of Constantinople. A Hungarian-Polish 
army suffered a terrible defeat at Varna in 1444, but in the summer of 1456 
a more successful crusade was proclaimed to relieve besieged Belgrade in 
neighboring Serbia. The crusade was preached with exceptional vigor and 
success by St. John Capistrano (who died shortly after its conclusion). A 
largely peasant army of twenty-five to thirty thousand commanded by the 
former Hungarian regent János Hunyadi dealt a decisive blow to the Ottoman 
forces and saved Belgrade. The army was quickly disbanded when the 
soldiers made their triumph an occasion for recrimination against the nobles, 
few of whom had participated in the campaign .^ Under Hunyadi's son. King 
Matthias I Corvinus (1458-1490), not only were the Turks kept at bay, but 
Hungary came to control a virtual empire, extending into Austria. 
The Hungarian peasantry was thus experienced in war and capable 
(like the Catalans but for more easily understandable reasons) of mobilizing 
themselves into an effective fighting force. In frontier regions such as 
Hungary, Sty ria and Carinthia where the peasantry were skilled at arms, 
they also were inclined during the late fifteenth century to reproach the 
nobility for levying exactions and taxes while abandoning their responsibili-
ties as protectors against the infideF. 
The death of Matthias Corvinus ushered in a period of mediocre 
rulership and of increased power of the nobility which succeeded in radically 
circumscribing the authority of King Vladislav II (1490-1516), a foreigner 
who lacked an effective base of support in Hungary. Disputes with the 
nobility and a renewal of Ottoman raids led to a deterioration in the military 
position of Hungary. Taxes collected to strengthen the frontier were diverted 
by the nobles for their own purposes without effective resistance from the 
royal court^ . In 1514 King Vladislav promulgated a crusade proclaimed by 
the newly elected Pope Leo X. The crusade appears to have been the idea 
of the primate of the Hungarian church. Archbishop Thomas Bakocz of 
^According to the account of giovanili de Tagliacozzo in Annales Minorimi seu îrium 
orci i num a S. Francisco Insîiîuîorum, vol. 12, part 3, Quaracchi, 1932, p. 793. 
^Jeno SzüCS, Die Ideologie des Bauernkrieges, in Sziics, "Nation und Geschichte: Studien", 
Cologne, 1981, pp. 331-338. 
^A History of Hungary^ ed. Peter F. SUGAR ET AL., Bloomington, 1990, pp. 76-78. 
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Esztergom, who had been a rival candidate for the papal throne and whom 
the amiable Pope Leo was eager to mollify .^ 
An army consisting largely of peasants was assembled in May, 1514, 
under the command of a frontier captain named Georgias Zeckel (or variants 
of that name) in the sources, but who in later accounts is usually known as 
Gyorgy Dózsa. The forces led by Dozsa were successful against the Turks, 
but as in 1456, complaints arose against the apparent dereliction of the 
nobles. Not only had they failed to show up for the crusade but were trying 
to prevent their peasant tenants from leaving their lands. Dózsa's army 
turned its crusade into a war against the nobility. A baronial force was 
hastily formed to suppress the recalcitrant Dózsa and his followers but 
suffered defeat at Nagylak on May 24. The crusade was cancelled by the 
frightened king and archbishop but it was too late. During most of the month 
of June the peasant armies seemed triumphant. The nobles belatedly found 
an effective champion in the person of János Zápolya, the count (voivod) of 
Transylvania. In July at Temesvár (Timi§oara) Dozsa's army was defeated 
by Zápolya and the rebellion came to an end in August. Dózsa was executed 
by order of the voivod by being placed in an iron throne which was then 
heated while he was "crowned" with a red-hot iron circlet. Dózsa's followers 
were then forced to eat his roasted flesh. One refused and he was instantly 
killed'^ . This gruesome execution was the one aspect of the Hungarian 
revolt that would be long remembered. For Montaigne, writing seventy years 
after, it exemplified cruelty mingled with cowardice (although he mistakenly 
thought the event had taken place in Poland)'^ 
The aftermath of the revolt was the imposition of servitude on the 
Hungarian peasantry, a condition that would not be officially lifted until 
1848. The authoritative law collection of 1517, the Tripartitum drawn up by 
István Werbõczy, justified this degradation as punishment for rebellion but 
^Documents concerning the 1514 uprising are collected in Monumenta rusticorum in 
Hmgaria rebellium, ed. Anton FEKETE NAGY ET AL., Budapest, 1979. 
'^ Accounts of the death of Dózsa in Monumenta rusticorum, n*" 142, 153, 160, 200, 227D. 
''Lászko BÁTI, Montaignes Aufzeichnung iiber Gyorgy Dózsas Tod. in Aus des Geschichte 
ostmitteleuropaischer Bauernbewegungen im XVI-XVII Jahrhundert, ed. Gusztáv HEKENEST, 
Budapest, 1972, pp. 457-460. 
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also linked it to an earlier historical crime, a supposed failure of the 
peasants' ancestors to fulfill their military obligations* .^ 
2. CATALONIA AND HUNGARY 
These events seem rather distant from Catalonia and its upheavals in 
the fifteenth century. Precisely by reason of a lack of direct connection, 
however, certain similarities demonstrate common elements in the conditions 
producing rural revolt at the end of the Middle Ages. There are clearly 
major differences between the Catalan and Hungarian revolts. The former 
lasted decades while the latter was over in three months. The Catalan war, 
although hardly to be regarded as a unilateral triumph for the entire peasant 
class, did result in the accomplishment of the goals of its leaders. While it 
did not undermine the basic structure of the seigneurial regime, the Sentencia 
de Guadalupe of 1486 did end the most graphic symbols of arbitrary lordship 
and abolished servile status. The defeat of the Hungarian peasants was 
complete and its results disastrous for future generations. This contrasts not 
only with Catalonia but with instances such as England after 1381, where 
despite the peasants' defeat, the revolt in the long term encouraged a 
gradual, unofficial decline of serfdom'^  
The position of the rulers of Hungary and Catalonia was in certain 
respects similar. Both Vladislav II and Joan II were opposed by a nobility 
who could claim to be defending the customs of the nation against foreig-
ners, the Polish-Bohemian Jagiello dynasty in one instance and the Trastàma-
ras in the other. Both peasants and nobles took advantage of the unpopula-
rity of the royal government to press their claims, although in Catalonia this 
provoked a pact between king and peasants while in Hungary there was 
never any question of such an alliance. The result of the Catalan war was a 
victory for royal power ushering the reign of Ferdinand II and the ultimate 
union with Castile. In Hungary, on the other hand, the nobles solidified their 
supremacy as a result of the crushing of the peasant rebellion. In Werboczy's 
Tripartitum a virtual "republic of nobles" was sanctioned. The noble class. 
^'Werboczy István Hánnaskônyve, ed. Sándor KOLOSVÁRI and Kelemen OvÁRi, budapest, 
1897, part I, tit. 3, pp. 56, 58 and part III, tit. 25, p. 406. 
^^Werboczy István Hánnaskônyve, ed. Sándor KOLOSVÁRI and Kelemen ÔVÁRI, budapest, 
1897, part I, tit. 3, pp. 56, 58 and part III, tit. 25, p. 406. 
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along with the king, was deemed to constitute the sovereign power of the 
state, the "crown"^ '^ . At the election of Vladislav II in 1490, the king 
recognized his obligations to the nobles and clergy and acknowledged that 
the Crown of St. Stephen lay in the custody of noble conservatores^^. The 
peasants and other common people had no part in rulership while the king 
himself was only the representative of what would remain essentially an 
aristocratic polity until the passing of the ancien regime^^. 
The events and consequences of the two peasant revolts thus differed 
greatly, but their context and causes show certain important similarities. This 
is the case, above all, with regard to peasant servitude both in relation to the 
reasons for the rebels' discontent and the justifications offered by apologists 
for the nobility. I would like to focus on these issues that seem to transcend 
the boundaries of national histories. 
3. SERFDOM 
In both Catalonia and Hungary at the end of the Middle Ages a 
substantial portion of the peasantry were serfs. The Catalan remenees formed 
more than half of the rural population in comarques of Old Catalonia and 
were especially numerous in the Vallès, Girones, Empordà, La Selva, 
Garrotxa and Osona. Although not unknown in such comarques as the 
Penedès and Anoia, peasant servitude was either rare or completely absent 
in New Catalonia. Although servile status was never precisely nor extensi-
vely defined in law, its key characteristic was the requirement to pay a 
redemption fine in order to obtain freedom or change lords. The manumis-
sion payment came to be considered one among a group of "mais usos" that 
both symbolized the subordinated position of the remenees and provided an 
income to lords in addition to the rent and miscellaneous exactions that 
comprised routine lordship over agricultural tenants. 
In Hungary a majority of peasants were dependents of their lords. 
They are referred to in Latin documents as iobagiones, derived from the 
''*János BAK, Konigtum unci Stande in Ungarn im 14.-16. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden, 1973, 
pp. 62-79. 
^^Capiîulaîio of Vladislav II, ed. BAK, Konigtum und Stande, pp. 152-154. 
^^History of Hungary, p. 80. 
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vernacular (Hungarian) jobbágy^\ For much of the fifteenth century, a 
period of expansion and relative prosperity in Hungary (very much unlike 
Catalonia), the lords relaxed their control over iobagiones, allowing them to 
take up crafts and settle in market towns. Toward the end of the century, 
however, a sharp rise in the value of agricultural produce induced lords to 
enforce prohibitions on leaving the land, to recall iobagiones from towns, 
and to raise rents and labor service demands'^  
In both Hungary and Catalonia servitude was not an age-old 
condition that had characterized the realm since its foundation but rather 
something imposed on a previously free peasantry. The chronology of 
enserfment was more compressed in Hungary. Although the privileges of 
nobles above common people were in place by the thirteenth century, the 
definition and enforcement of unfree status was put into effect only after the 
Black Death. In Catalonia the nobility may be said to have achieved certain 
rights and immunities with respect to comital and royal authority as early as 
the eleventh century, permitting them a greater power over tenants. The 
effective elaboration of servitude as a routine practice, however, dates from 
the thirteenth century. 
The late Middle Ages saw a degree of high degree of instability in 
the relations between lords and tenants. Faced with a declining population 
and reduced revenues, lords throughout Europe attempted to apply more 
pressure to their tenants. Lords were faced with the manifestation of a latent 
problem in the collection of revenue within the feudal system: the peasants' 
effective possession of the land. As hereditary tenants of specific parcels of 
land, the peasants could resist seigneurial efforts at consolidation and their 
work for their masters was difficult to supervise. Servitude, under these 
circumstances, was not so much the manifestation of a violent aristocratic 
society but a way for landlords to increase revenue without making 
investments in the land or otherwise treating it as an economic enterprise. 
'^Peculiarly enough the word is derived from jóbb meaning "better", and in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries referred to powerful men close to the king (similar to the Latin optimaîes). 
By the late fourtheenth, early fifteenth centuries it was applied to servile dependents. I am 
grateful to Professor János Bak of the Central European University in Budapest for this 
information. 
'^ ^Gyorgy SzÉKELY, Le passage ¿i l'économie hassée sur la corvée en Europe centrale et 
orientale de l'année 1514, in "Études Historiques Hongroises 1975", 1 (Budapest, 1975); Gábor 
BARTA, Der ungarische Bauernkrieg vom Jahre 1514, in Aus des Geschichte ostmitteleuropciis-
cher Bauernbewegungen, pp. 63-69. 
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In the demographic and economic debacle that followed the Black 
Death, peasants who were already serfs could be forced to pay more in the 
way of rent or prevented from exercising an option to leave and choose 
among attractive vacant tenancies. There was a seigneurial reaction 
everywhere in Europe that attempted to salvage feudal revenues. This took 
different forms and met with variable success In Catalonia its short-term 
effectiveness is visible in the increase in redemption prices after 1348 despite 
(or rather because of) what would appear to have been a more favorable 
bargaining position for peasant labor'^ . Lords could, at least for a time, 
overcome the market forces of supply and demand (specifically, the shortage 
of labor) by virtue of their seigneurial power. In some instances this was 
backed up by the state as in fourteenth-century England where the Ordinance 
and Statute of Labourers (1349, 1351) prevented a rise in agricultural wages 
thus for a time defying the laws of classical economics. In England and 
Catalonia, unusualy among Western European nations, the late Middle Ages 
saw a strengthening of serfdom, but by 1500, the institution was moribund 
in these countries as well as in France and Italy where it had barely survived 
the thirteenth century^ .^ 
Under certain circumstances lords might try to recoup their difficult 
economic position by offering inducements rather than by repression. In 
order to populate deserted manses, Catalan lords sometimes reduced rents 
or commuted labor and other services. The complexity of land-holding also 
blurred the distinction between who constituted a lord and who was a tenant 
in Catalonia. Emphyteusis and the various layers of leases and sub-leases 
created a privileged category of nominal tenant, sometimes technically 
unfree, who had extensive holdings on favorable terms that were cultivated 
by others. As already noted, until the end of the fifteenth century, Hungarian 
peasants, although supposedly constrained by servitude, were able to set 
themselves up as petty entrepreneurs in small towns established by nobles 
who saw revenues from that source as preferable to maintaining large 
agricultural domains. 
''^ Paul FREEDMAN, Els origens de la servitud page sa a la Catalunya medieval, Vic, 1993, 
pp. 189-190; Mercè AVENTÍN I PuiG, Lei societaî rural a Catalunya en temps feudais: Vallès 
oriental, segles XIII-XVI, Barcelona, 1996, pp. 196-201. 
-"Robert BRENNER, The Rises and Declines of Serfdom in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe, in "Serfdom and Slavery: Studies in Legal Bondage", ed. M.L. BuSH, Harlow, 1996, 
pp. 247-276. 
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It is not always easy to measure the actual burden of a regime of 
exploitation such as that implicit in feudal society. This is essentially a 
problem of both economic reality and social perception. What was in fact 
being extracted by lords changed, but so did the perceptions of opportunity 
on the part of tenants for evasion, accommodation or departure. These did 
not always go in tandem. For example, the imposition of redemption 
payments in thirteenth-century Catalonia did not necessarily mean that 
peasants were unable to manipulate the system. The very frequency of such 
payments in surviving documents might suggest that although a burden to 
tenants and significant source of revenue for lords, the redemptions reflected 
a system of unequal but not inflexible relations between landlords and 
tenants '^. Manumission in order to change lords might be part of the way 
in which land was held rather than the symbol of oppressive lordship it 
would become in later centuries. 
The harsh economic conditions after the Black Death provoked a 
seigneurial reaction, not only in Hungary and Catalonia but throughout 
Europe. The economic changes, however, are not the sole explanation for 
the changes in society at the end of the Middle Ages. The same demographic 
and economic pressures produced very different results in different regions 
and these depended on political factors and the earlier forms of social 
organization in the respective societies. 
4. EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 
One of the most significant facts of European history is the 
differential evolution of Eastern and Western Europe that first becomes 
perceptible towards the end of the Middle Ages. In the West, the attempt of 
lords to extract more from their tenants by either imposing serfdom or more 
rigid enforcement of its bonds was unsuccessful. In England, as in Catalonia, 
peasant revolts resulted in the decay or outright abolition of servile status. 
While areas of Western Europe differed as to how strong serfdom was in the 
high Middle Ages, how powerful the seigneurial reaction after the Black 
Death was, and how servitude was ended, they entered the modern era with 
"'LIUÍS To FiGUERAS, Drets de justicia i incisos: Hipótesi sobre els origens de la pagesia de 
remença, "Revista d'Història Medieval", 6 (1995), pp. 141-149. 
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a seigneurial system, but one not founded on servile tenure. In France, 
Catalonia, indeed in most of Western Europe it is possible to regard the 
sixteenth century as still characterized by a feudal system of land tenure, 
while unusually in England there are signs of an early capitalist process of 
consolidation^ .^ 
The West did not share a single evolutionary path in its forms of 
agricultural exploitation. In England during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries peasant proprietorship yielded to large-scale farming of a pre-
capitalist sort while elsewhere, for the most part, small peasant holdings 
remained the rule. Throughout western Europe, however, in contrast with 
the East, the legal condition of the peasantry was free. Eastern Europe, 
settled by free peasants as a frontier region in the Middle Ages, would 
became a territory of widespread, nearly universal serfdom from the 
sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries. How this happened is one of the great 
comparative historical questions and is tied up with the differential fortunes 
of European states in the modern era and the problem of eastern European 
backwardness^ .^ In the modern era Eastern Europe would be agricultural, 
dominated by large estates and characterized by either state imposed 
servitude (Russia) or a weak central government and virtually independent 
nobility (Poland, Hungary)^ "^ . 
One way of explaining this disparity is to identify Western European 
capitalism as the motive force, creating a quasi-colonial regime in the eastern 
periphery in order to ensure a supply of inexpensive agricultural products 
and so freeing up the West for a new economic expansion. In Immanuel 
Wallerstein's world system, the distinction between European center and 
'"AVENTIN, LM. societaî rural a Catalunya; Robert BRENNER, Agrarian Class Structure and 
Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, in "The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class 
Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe", ed. T.H. ASTON and C.H.E. 
PHILPIN, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 46-62; BRENNER, Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe 
in Light of Developments in the West, in "The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: 
Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century", ed. Daniel 
CHIROT, Barkeley, 1989, pp. 47-50. 
*^ I^n general see the essays collected in "The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe". 
'"^ Lészló MAKKAI, Neo-Serfdom: Its Origin and Nature in east Central Europe, "Slavic 
Review", 34 (1975), pp. 225-238; Béla KiRÁLY, Neo-Serfdom in Hungary, "Slavic Review", 
34 (1975), pp. 269-278; Peter GUNST, Agrarian Systems of Central and Eastern Europe, in "The 
Origins of Backwardness", pp. 53-91. 
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periphery is crucial to the growth of modern capitalisme .^ But this model 
consigns the Mediterranean as well as the East to the role of periphery. The 
Wallerstein model also suffers from a tendency to treat trade as inevitably 
capitalist and so assumes that the governing classes of sixteenth-century 
Europe acted to maximize economic efficiency as a universal and unquestio-
ned goal. 
Almost all of Europe experienced the catastrophe of the Black Death 
and the successive plagues, yet the two halves would be sharply differentia-
ted as regards serfdom. Similarly, the expansion of trade in such commodi-
ties as textiles, cattle and above all grain could produce very different social 
results. The different experiences, especially between East and West, 
demonstrate the limitations of purely demographic or economic explanations 
of social change. Class relations and the power of nobles or the state 
produced outcomes other than what would be predicted by the impersonal 
interaction of supply and demand'^ .^ 
Hungary might seem to exemplify the experience of the East: the 
imposition of servitude in the late medieval and early modern eras, and the 
assertion of nobles' power at the expense of the king and the peasantry. 
Catalonia would then fit into the Western model with the overthrow of 
serfdom. Peasant small-proprietorship was preserved in Catalonia, and so the 
abolition of servitude did not lead to the capitalist agricultural organization 
that characterized England-^ .^ But the contrast between Catalonia and 
Hungary is not as neat or dramatic as simple geographical typologies of 
development would suggest. Hungary in the early modern era would not be 
an exporter of grain to the West on the order of Poland or eastern Germany. 
Its main product would be livestock and its market the somewhat fading 
towns of southern Germany, not the dynamic Atlantic regions'^ .^ Moreover 
so much of Hungary's medieval lands passed into Ottoman hands that its 
'"^ Immanuel WALLERSTEIN, The Modern World System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York, 1974. 
-^ See Marian MALOWIST, Le commerce de la Baltique et le problème des luttes sociales en 
Pologne aux XV' et XVr siècles, in "La Pologne au X'^  Congrès International des Sciences 
Historiques à Rome", Warsaw, 1955, pp. 126-146; Jerome BLUM, The Rise of Serfdom in 
Eastern Europe, "American Historical Review", 62 (1957), pp. 807-836. 
-^ But in this regard it is England, not Catalonia that was the exception and the historical 
problem is not to explain economic stagnation but the more unusual take-off experienced by 
England, BRENNER, Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe, pp. 15-20; 47-50. 
'^GVNST, Agrarian Systems, pp. 70-72. 
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experience stands between that of the Turkish occupied Balkans and the vast 
regions of estates and servitude of northeastern Europe^ .^ 
Rather than looking at them as examples of opposite or complemen-
tary regional evolution, we might examine the peculiar similarities of 
Hungary and Catalonia in the period of peasant uprisings. What they shared 
at the end of the Middle Ages was a society deeply divided about the 
legitimacy of servitude. Not only did peasants agitate for the end to arbitrary 
seigneurial control in both realms, but the need of the lords to justify the 
institution of servitude would take similar forms. 
5. HISTORICAL MYTHOLOGY 
AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
In both Hungary and Catalonia (more so in Hungary), serfdom was 
a relatively recent institution, one that was not easily explicable in terms of 
customary law and practice. Historical myths were elaborated to put back 
into authoritative and distant time the division of society into servile and 
noble. More than this, both societies had to explain subordination of one 
segment of the nation by another. In some regions of Europe it was possible 
to justify servitude by virtue of conquest. Thus the Catalans in Greece or 
Sardinia might hold the native population in some form of subjugation by 
victory in war. Elsewhere myths of differential origins were devised even in 
the absence of ethnic or linguistic distinction. In France serfs could be 
regarded as descendants of the conquered Gauls while the nobles' ancestors 
were the Franks-^ .^ 
In Catalonia the fundamental division of society was placed at the 
time of the Carolingian conquest of the Spanish March. The Franks 
(sometimes specifically Charlemagne or Louis the Pious) called on the 
Christian inhabitants of the future Catalonia to rise up against the Moors. 
"^ See BRENNER'S typologies in Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe, pp. 40-50. 
"^Susan REYNOLDS, Medieval "Origines gentium" and the Community of the Reahu, 
"History", 69 (1984), p. 384. As Reynolds notes tracinig different classes to different racial 
genealogies was more popular after 1500 than during the Middle Ages. 
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Those who out of timidity refused were kept in the servile status they had 
accepted under the infidel, but now to be ruled by Christians^^ 
This legend is first found in legal commentaries perhaps as early as 
the late thirteenth century and became widely although not universally 
accepted among historians during the late-medieval and early modern 
periods. It had the advantage of placing the invention of serfdom in the deep 
past, at the time of the foundation of Catalonia. It therefore sanctioned 
servitude as a custom of equal age with the polity itself. 
Even more, the legendary account in effect acknowledged that 
servitude was contrary to the natural liberties of Catalans but nevertheless 
justly separated the remenees from those worthy of enjoying those freedoms. 
It functioned as a secular version of the hereditarily transmitted punishments 
in the Bible such as Adam's Fall or the Curse of Noah against Ham. Without 
denying that the servile population was ethnically Catalan, the myth of the 
peasants' cowardly ancestors explained why they were treated as if they were 
a conquered and captive people. 
As a complement to this justification for serfdom, the legend of 
Otger Cátalo, fully developed at the opening of the fifteenth century, 
explained the privileges of the nobility^ *^ . The aristocratic families of 
Catalonia were descended from those who aided Otger Cátalo, a warrior who 
waged a guerilla war against the Muslims in the Pyrenees before the Franks 
invaded. The nobles, therefore, and not the Franks or the counts of 
Barcelona were the true founders of Catalonia. Here there is a similar 
although less successful attempt to that of the Hungarian nobility to make 
their order the repository of the nation's political identity and source of its 
government. At the same time, the legend of Otger implicitly fits that of the 
origins of peasant serfdom. Those who aided or even came before Charle-
magne in fighting the enemy were to be privileged and exalted in the future 
history of Catalonia, while those who failed this moment of testing would be 
serfs, along with their descendants. 
'l have discussed these legends in Juristes catalans i els origens de la servitud, in Paul 
FREEDMAN, Assaig d'historia de lapagesia catalana (segles XI-XV), Barcelona, 1988, pp. 172-
181 and Cowardice, Heroism and the Legendary Origins of Catalonia, "Past and Present", 121 
(1988), pp. 3-29. 
^-Miquel COLL I ALENTORN, La llegenda d'Otger Cátalo i els Nou Barons, "Estudis 
Romanics", 1 (1947-1948), pp. 1-47. 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 3.0 España (by-nc) 
http://estudiosmedievales.revistas.csic.es
THE EVOLUTION OF SERVILE PEASANTS 923 
In Hungary one finds a very similar historical/mythical justification 
for servitude. As in Catalonia, unwillingness to risk warfare was set in the 
foundational past in order to account for social difference. It was supposed 
that in pre-Christian times the Magyars held an annual military muster and 
that failure to attend was punished by death, banishment or hereditary 
servitude. Those of lower condition were descended from Hungarians who 
had failed this test of valor. 
For Hungary the introduction of the legendary origins of serfs can 
be pin-pointed more precisely than for Catalonia. Between 1282 and 1285 
Simon of Kéza, court chaplain to King Ladislas "the Cuman," composed a 
Hungarian history that elaborated a heroic past''^ His primary interest was 
to justify the prerogatives of nobles rather than to explain servitude, which 
was only in its first stages of development. His fanciful explanation for the 
distinction between nobles and common people, nevertheless, would be 
useful for subsequent generations to explain where the Hungarian iobagiones 
came from. 
Much in the manner of the Catalans, the Hungarians made use of 
literary and historical narratives to connect themselves to a heroic European 
past. Charlemagne and his conquests joined the Catalans to the imperial and 
Prankish mainstream. For the Magyars, the authoritative figures of the past 
were the Huns^ .^ Although we were accustomed to thinking of the image 
of the Huns as entirely negative or destructive, they are portrayed favorably 
in such medieval works as the German Nibelungenlied (ca. 1200). By this 
time the Magyars, whose destructive invasions took place in the tenth 
century, were confused with the real Huns of Late Antiquity (whence 
"Hungarian"). 
Simon of Kéza was the first Hungarian chronicler to accept the 
Western belief that the Magyars were descendants of the Huns. In the year 
700, according the Gesta Hungarorum, the Huns elected captains and began 
their movement westward from "Scythia". Their leader was a certain Kadar 
Simon de KÉZA, Gesta Himgarorimu ed. Alexander DOMANOVSKY, in "Scriptores Rerum 
Hungaricum", vol. 1, Budapest, 1937, c. 7, pp. 147-148. 
•^*0n the Hungarian legends of the origins of nobility and servitude I have relied Jeno 
SzüCS, Theoretical Elements in Master Simon of Kéza's "Gesta Himgarorum" (J282-J285A.D.), 
in "Études Historiques Hongroises 1975", vol. 1, pp. 241-281 and Richard C. HOFFMANN, 
Outsiders by Birth and Blood: Racist Ideologies and Realities around the Periphery of Medieval 
European Culture, "Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History", new series, 6 (1983), pp. 
14-21. 
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who developed a program to form an army. A customary law was establis-
hed that a summons would be issued annually to a military gathering of the 
able-bodied male population. Those who failed to attend without good reason 
would be subject by the "Lex Scitica" either to execution by being cut with 
a plowshare, degradation by means of banishment, or reduction to the status 
of serf^. 
Simon concludes with a formulation of the problem answered by his 
history: it was his own wicked actions that differentiated one Hungarian 
from another, for otherwise how to explain why those sharing the same 
parentage should be noble and ignoble? The latter's ancestors must have 
perpetrated some crime^ .^ 
So far the distinction is simply between nobles and everyone else, 
but later historians and jurists would use this passage to justify the servitude 
of some Hungarians and the privileges of others. In the Chronica Hungaro-
rum of János Thuróczy, the Hunnish military laws originated the separation 
of nobles from serfs^ .^ Thuróczy repeats Simon of Kéza but adds a few 
details. The summons to the muster is now made by a messenger bearing a 
bloody sword (a practice that actually accompanied the calling up of 
Transylvanian frontier soldiers in the late Middle Ages). Thuróczy also 
specifically states that by means of the muster and the punishment for failure 
to attend many had been degraded to perpetual rusticity {et muitos generatio-
ne de hac perpetuam redegit in rusticitatem). The concluding rhetorical 
question now asks: "for as they were of one and the same birth...how else 
could it be that one could be a lord, another a serf or peasant? ..."^^ 
Thuróczy's Chronica reflects the seigneurial pressures of the late fifteenth 
century in its assumption that serfs and rustics are the same thing. 
^^Gesîci Hungarorum, c. 7, pp. 147-148: "Quicunque ergo edictum contempsisset 
praetendere non valens rationem, lex Scitica per medium cultro huius detruncabat, vel exponi 
in causas despénalas, aut detrudi in communium servitutem". On the meaning of "exponi in 
causas desperatas", a formulation derived from Roman law, see SzüCS, Theoretical Elements, 
pp. 268-269. 
^^Ihfd. c. 7, p. 148: "Vitia itaque et excessus huius unum Hungarum ab alio separavit, alias 
cun unus pater et unus mater omnes Húngaros procreaverit, quorum unus nobilis, alter innobilis 
diceretur, nisi victus per tales casus criminis haberetur". 
^^Johannes de THURÓCZ, Chronica Hungarorum, ed. Elisabeth GALÁNTAI and Julius KRISTÓ, 
vol. 1, Buidapest, 1985, c. 12, pp. 33-34. 
^^Ibici., p. 34: "Nam cum una et eadem fuerint generatio, et a quondam Hunor et Magor 
unanimiter processerint, aliter fieri nequivisset, ut alter dominus, alter servus vel rusticus effici 
potuisset". 
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In an example of the power of pseudo-historical narrative to 
influence social reality, this version of foundational events and justification 
for servitude was put into effect after the failed insurrection of 1514. 
Legislation in November of that year condemned the rebellious populace to 
"perpetual rusticity" {dominis ipsorum terrestribus mera et perpetua 
rusticitate sint subiectï), echoing Thúroczy's formulation^^. Very similar 
wording appears in the Tripartitum. Here the degradation of peasants is 
explained as a consequence of the recent rebellion but also in terms of the 
customs of the early Hungarians. The nobles were privileged because their 
ancestors answered the military summons"^. The differentiation between 
lords and serfs (and between nobles and ignobles or rustics) originated at this 
time according a statement derived from Simon of Kéza via Thuróczy'*^ 
Thus in the Tripartitum there is a short-term explanation for the subordina-
tion of the peasantry (the events of 1514) and a long-term one (the responses 
to the Huns' military customs). Werboczy also asserts that iht populus of 
Hungary, in whom resides the power of the Hungarian Crown, consists of 
the nobles and not the peasants, a statement reminiscent of Gabriel Turrell's 
assertion made in 1476 that Charlemagne established Catalan liberties for 
those of high birth, not rustics"^ "^ . 
6. HISTORICAL MYTHS AND IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSE 
In both Hungary and Catalonia, therefore, the defense of servitude 
was maintained by reference to very similar myths of national origin. At a 
formative moment one segment of the population showed itself courageous 
and therefore worthy of liberty. In Catalonia this courage was demonstrated 
against the Moors in a species of religious war that was also a battle of 
national liberation. In Hungary the fundamental division reflected pre-
Monumenta rusîicorum in Himgaria rebellium, n" 202, article 14, p. 260. 
'^^Werhoczy István Hánnaskõnyve, part. 1, tit. 3, pp. 56, 58. 
'^^Ibid., part 1, tit. 3, p. 58: "Haec sanctio plurimos Hungarorum (ut praefertur) plebae 
perhibetur effecisse condicionis. Nam cum una et eadem de generacione unanimiter processerint, 
aliter fieri nequivisset, ut hic dominus, ille servus, hie nobilis, ille ignobilis, et rusticus 
efficeretur". 
^-Gabriel TURRELL, Recort, cit. COLL l ALENTORN, Llegenda d'Oîger Caíalo, p. 27; "E 
aquest és lo principi de les llibertats de Cathalunya, car no principia en homens rústichs ni 
apiegadiços, sino en alts e valerosos". 
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Christian custom and law set in the supposedly authoritative time of the 
Huns. 
Many medieval states developed heroic myths of their beginnings, 
but in Hungary and Catalonia these legendary origins also served to explain 
class structure. The birth of the polity and the identity of the people 
coincided with a definition of those who were privileged and free and those 
inhabitants deprived of rights and of liberty. These stories of national and 
class foundations combine already-existing legends with ideas found in the 
French literary tradition, specifically the cycle of poems elaborated around 
the figure of Charlemagne. In Catalonia the legend of the cowardly peasants 
was probably derived from France via the heroic Latin chronicles purporting 
to be by Archbishop Turpin of Rheims, known in Catalonia as early as 
1173. Here and in related invented histories, serfs who aided Charlemagne 
were rewarded with freedom while free men who shirked their obligations 
were condemned to servitude'^^ The idea of relating servitude to failure to 
obey a military summons appears in many medieval contexts'^. The 
particular role of Charlemagne, however, originates with Pseudo-Turpin and 
would be elaborated on in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in such 
French poems as the Chanson de Gui de Bourgogne and the Roman de 
Renan le Contrefaif^. 
The origin of the Hungarian legends is somewhat less clear, although 
their development can be located chronologically more precisely than for 
Catalonia. Before Simon of Kéza's Gesta Hungarorum there was a tradition 
of national mythology in chronicles, but as already mentioned, Simon was 
the first Hungarian to make use of the putative connection between the 
Magyars and the Huns. Simon travelled in France and Italy and was familiar 
•* On the Pseudo-Turpin and its aristocratic audience in France, see Gabrielle M. SPIEGEL, 
Romancing the Past: The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France, 
Berkeley, 1993, pp. 55-98. The reception of the Pseudo-Turpin material in Catalonia, Adalbert 
HÀMEL, Arnaldus de Monte und der Liber S. Jacobi, "Estudis Universitaris Catalans", 21 
(1936), pp. 147-159; Histcma de Carles Maynes e Rot Ik): tradúcela catalana del segle XV, ed. 
Martí de RlQUER, Barcelona, 1960. See also Gerhard RAUSCHEN, Die Legende Karls der 
Grossen ini IL und 12. Jahrhundert, Leipzig, 1890, pp. 97-125, especially p. 108. 
"^ •^ Henry LEMAÎTRE, Le refus de service d'ost et l'origine du servage, "Bibliothèque de 
l'Ecole des Chartes", 75 (1914), pp. 231-238. 
•^ •^ Gui DE BOURGOGNE, W . 177-180, éd. F. GUESSARD and H. MICHELANT, Paris, 1859, 
p. 6; Le Roman de Renard le Contrefait, éd. Gaston REYNAUD and Henri LEMAÎTRE, vol. 1, 
Paris, 1914, p. 353. 
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with Roman law, French romance and Latin literature'^ ^. Other than the 
barbaric form of execution (being cut in half), the punishments for failure 
to attend the Huns' muster are derived from Roman law. In addition Simon 
was probably induced by the same French literary and quasi-legal tradition 
that influenced Catalonia to legitimate noble privilege over common people 
by reference to military courage in the distant past. 
Why were such elaborate justifications necessary? To some extent 
this question is related to the reason why these legends had so much more 
resonance in Catalonia and Hungary than in France, their place of origin. In 
France servitude declined from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. In certain 
French regions (especially the West), servitude had never been strong. In 
Languedoc it simply ceased to be important by the thirteenth century, partly 
as a result of the collapse of the nobility in the wake of the Albigensian 
Crusade. In the central regions of France, peasants were encouraged to 
purchase their freedom from the crown'^ ^ In Catalonia and -Hungary, 
servitude not only increased in the late Middle Ages, but became an issue 
sufficiently divisive to create civil war. 
There are three factors that Hungary and Catalonia share with regard 
to what might be called the intellectual context of servitude: 1) servitude 
could not readily be explained by an appeal to obvious customary law and 
practice; 2) there was no convenient way of assuming different ethnic origins 
for servile and noble populations; 3) the audience or "consumers" of 
historical legends were not exclusively antiquarian or literary writers but 
lawyers and others concerned with defending existing institutions. 
The purpose of the legendary origins of privilege and serfdom was 
to exalt the heroism of the nation while defining only a minority of its 
inhabitants as its true constituents. In other countries conquest or ethnic and 
religious difference could be used to explain subordination'*^. The English 
in Ireland excused their subjugation of the inhabitants on the basis of their 
alleged barbarism, on rights based on conquest and later on religious 
difference. The Catalans in Athens also could justify dominating the native 
population on the basis of religious heterodoxy and the fact of conquest. 
'SziJCS, Theoretical Elements, pp. 251-252, 268-269, 278-280. 
'^ ^William CHESTER JORDAN, From Servitude to Freedom: Manumission in the Sénonais in 
the Thirteenth Century, Philadelphia, 1986. 
'*^Robert BARTLETT, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural change, 
950-1350, Princeton, 1993, pp. 85-105. 
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What Stands out for Hungary and Catalonia is that no attempt was made to 
suggest that the servile population was different in its ethnic origins and 
identity from the nobles. What made one a "real" Hungarian or Catalan as 
opposed to a serf was based on a historic moment of foundation, not a 
difference in the blood. 
The lack of such "racial" distinction made it more difficult to 
maintain the justice of subjugation with complete confidence than in 
conquered territories or those places with populations of manifestly different 
origins. Catalan jurists (notably Tomás Mieres), and members of the royal 
court (such as Queen Maria de Luna) expressed grave doubts over whether 
the treatment of remenees could be reconciled with legitimate custom or 
divine and natural law**^ . Objections in Hungary were more the province of 
religious critics of society, especially members of the Observant wing of the 
Franciscans who were especially active before and after 1500, some of 
whom were even involved in the rebellion of 1514^ .^ 
In both realms peasants themselves could justify their revolt by 
reversing the rationales for subordination and aristocratic privileges. In 
Catalonia the formation of syndicates of remenees in 1448-1449 provided an 
occasion to dispute the nobles' myth^'. It was argued that the ancestors of 
the remenees had been not timid Christians but rather Muslims, and that 
servitude was instituted to encourage conversion, not as a perpetual sentence. 
Once the conversion to Christianity took place, servitude should have been 
voided, but this the lords, through selfish greed, had not done. While it is 
unlikely that any Catalan peasant was in fact eager to claim Muslim ancestry 
in the fifteenth century, the argument was an ingenious response to the myth 
of the cowardly ancestors of the remenees. 
In Hungary it was the code of bravery and its link to freedom that 
was appropriated by peasants and their apologists in 1514. Accepting the 
Antoni RIERA I MELIS, El hisbat de Gì rana al primer terç del segle XV. Aproximado al 
context socio-economic de la sèrie sismica oli tina (1427-1428), "Anuario de Estudios 
Medievales", 22 (1992), pp. 161-204; Fidel FITA, LO papa Benêt XIIIy los pagesos de remensa, 
"La Renaxensa", 5 (1875), pp. 122-130; FREEDMAN, Origens de la servitudpagesa, pp. 203-
214. 
°^Jeno Szucs, Oppositionelle Strôimng der Franziskaner im Hintergrund des Bauernkrieges 
and der Reformation in Ungarn, in "Études Historiques Hongroises 1985", vol. 2, Budapest, 
1985, pp. 483-512. 
'^ 'Discussed in FREEDMAN. Origens de la servitud pagesa, pp. 211-212 and edited pp. 247-
249. 
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equation by which military courage provided the moral basis for liberty, the 
peasants not only proclaimed themselves the sanctified defenders of Hungary 
and of Christendom against the Turk but plausibly condemned the nobility 
for failing to aid the crusade. The nobles failed to perform their role as a 
warrior class for which they received their privileges. Moreover, this failure 
contrasted with the bravery of the peasants who thus threw back at their 
masters the accusation of cowardice. The bloody sword mentioned in 
Thuroczy's chronicle as an emblem of the Huns' military summons was used 
by the peasant crusaders in their recruitment, a clear message about their 
courage and an implied denunciation of the nobility for failing to uphold the 
fidelity that they were supposed to render by Hungarian constitutional 
tradition. 
Counter-myths and condemnation of the nobles' greed and military 
failure functioned as what Guy Marchai in the context of Swiss history has 
called "the answer of the peasants" to widely-diffused seigneurial justifica-
tions for domination^ .^ In Switzerland and along the North Sea coast there 
were independent peasant republics in the Middle Ages that managed to hold 
off efforts by princes and nobles to conquer them^^ Nothing comparable 
to the war-songs of the Swiss cantons or the Dithmarschen peasants survives 
for Catalonia or Hungary where there was of course no question of peasants 
gaining political autonomy. Nevertheless the same exaltation of piety 
mingled with courage and the same condemnation of the nobility for its 
arrogance and exaggerated sense of self-worth may be found at different 
ends of Europe. In Catalonia, Hungary as well as England and Germany, 
forms of resistance developed within the traditions of peasant society without 
requiring an external intellectual stimulus from towns or church reform 
movements. 
Let us return for a moment to the geographical distribution of 
servitude in the transition from the medieval to modern era. Robert 
Brenner's essays have shown the limitations of a simple East/West 
distinction and also demonstrate that the West did not pursue a course 
"Guy P. MARCHAL, Die Antwort der Bciuern: Elemente unci Schichmngen des eidgenôssis-
chen Geschichtsschreihung imd Geschichtsbewusstsein am Ausgang des Mittelalters, "Vortrage 
und Forschungen", 31 (1987), pp. 59-90. 
"^ P^eter BLICKLE, Das Gesetz der Eidgenossen: Vherlegungen zur Enstehung der Schweiz, 
1200-1400, "Historische Zeitschrift", 255 (1992), pp. 561-586; William L. URBAN, 
Dithmarschen: A Medieval Peasant Republic, Lewiston, 1991. 
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leading inevitably to a capitalist economy until the relatively recent past. 
Outside of the important exception of England, there was considerable 
continuity in the West between the medieval period and the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Both eras were characterized by predominantly 
agrarian societies organized into small units cultivated by peasant proprietors 
under a regime of extra-economic extraction. Servitude was declining or 
irrelevant except in those territories (notably Catalonia) where it was thrown 
off by force. 
In eastern Europe, apart from regions conquered by the Turks, 
servitude was extended in the late medieval and early modern centuries. 
Hungary thus conforms to a pattern, but its experience provokes certain 
questions about why serfdom triumphed. As already noted, Hungary did not 
produce grain or other basic agricultural commodities for the Western 
market (largely because of the prohibitive cost of transportation in compari-
son with the water-borne traffic of Poland and eastern Germany). Neither 
can servitude in Hungary readily be explained by the absence of village 
communities among peasants^ " .^ Not only does the 1514 insurrection show 
the strength of peasant solidarities in hungary, but conversely the success of 
the Catalan revolt can not be traced to an unusually strong sense of 
community. The dispersed habitat of Old Catalonia and the absence of 
formal local bylaws (on the order of the German Weistümer) did not prevent 
the formation of syndicates of remenees in the fifteenth century and of 
military units supported by villagers at the time of the Catalan Civil War. 
The different outcomes of the Catalan and Hungarian conflicts are 
thus not to be explained in terms of an inevitable contrast between the two 
halves of Europe. The situations in the fifteenth century were quite similar. 
A weak monarchy, a seigneurial reaction, and an elaborate seigneurial 
justification for serfdom characterized both principalities. The particular 
circumstances of each nation affected the fate of the uprisings, especially the 
political circumstances. The Catalan monarchs, although in great difficulty, 
inherited a stronger constitutional tradition of authority. They also allied 
themselves, albeit inconsistently, with the peasants. Even with the support 
of elements of the city of Barcelona, the Catalan nobility was unable to 
maintain the servile system. In Hungary, the conflict between nobles and 
Which BRENNER uses as a hypothesis, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic 
Development", pp. 40-41. 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 3.0 España (by-nc) 
http://estudiosmedievales.revistas.csic.es
THE EVOLUTION OF SERVILE PEASANTS 931 
king was subsumed by the shared fear of the peasants. Although supported 
by elements of the Franciscan order and led by a few members of the petty 
nobility, the peasants of Hungary in 1514 lost in their attempt to portray 
themselves as faithful patriots. The overwhelming impression of the 
chroniclers and in messages exchanged among Hungarian nobles and officials 
was one of common terror at the supposed bloodthirsty savagery of the 
rebels, something one does not see in Catalonia, England or even to the 
same extent in Germany in 1525. 
Neither in Catalonia nor in Hungary was there an inevitable outcome 
to the conflict over serfdom. The history of the two conflicts confirms 
Brenner's emphasis on the importance of ideology and political structures in 
the transition to from feudalism to modernity. 
RESUME 
En Hongrie, comme dans Ia Catalogne, il y eut un grand soulèvement des paysans 
au fin du Moyen Âge. La révolte hongroise de 1514 fut suprime par la noblesse, mais les 
paysans catalans effectuèrent l'abolition du servage en 1486. Malgré cette divergence 
essentielle, on peut constater quelques ressemblances entre les deux pays, surtout à l'égard 
des justifications idéologiques pour le servage et les condamnations à rencontre le servage. 
La fondation pour ce conflit idéologique remont au treizième siècle quand les 
mythes historiques de l'établissement de la nation étaient en procès d'élaboration, basés sur 
le cycle littéraire français "Pseudo-Turpin". Pour la Catalogne, l'époque carolingienne fut 
convenable pour justifier les privilèges nobiliaires et la subjugation de la paysannerie, 
hiérarchie basé sur le courage, d'un côté, et la couardise, à l'autre, pendant les guerres contre 
l'Islam. En Hongrie, une épreuve similaire située dans les temps de la fondation nationale 
expliquèrent pourquoi les aristocrats dominèrent les paysans, mais c'était les Huns, ancêtres 
supposés des Magyars, qui fournirent le contexte historique. Dans les deux cas, les genres 
littéraires étaient adoptés pour servir des théories, juridiques et historiographiques lancées 
comme preuves de la justice du servage. On peut aussi tirer des indications pour le Bas 
Moyen Âge des réponses des paysans et leurs défenseurs contre ces mythes historiques. 
SUMMARY 
Both Catalonia and Hungary experienced major peasant uprisings at the end of the 
Middle Ages. The Hungarian Revolt of 1514 was suppressed by the nobility while the Catalan 
peasants succeeded in throwing off servitude in 1486. Despite this fundamental difference, 
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there are certain ideological similarities between Hungary and Catalonia, particularly with 
regard to the ideological justifications for servitude and attacks against it. 
The background to this ideological conflict goes back to the late thirteenth century 
when historical myths of foundation were elaborated in both countries based on the French 
Pseudo-Turpin cycle. In Catalonia, the Carolingian era provided a suitable background to 
explaining the privileges of nobles and the subordination of the peasantry based on courage 
and cowardice aganist the Muslim enemy. In Hungary, a similar test of bravery placed in 
early times explained why nobles dominated over the peasantry, but the historical context was 
now the supposed Hunnish ancestors of the Magyars. In both instances literary forms were 
taken over by historians and jurists to explain and justify servitude. We also have some idea 
from the late Middle Ages of how these assertations were answered by advocates of the 
rebellious peasantry. 
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